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Abstract 
Culture is used as a development strategy in many European cities, a means to attract 
capital, to improve the image of the city, and to promote unity and co-operation. Like 
other strategies it has winners and losers and, in its symbolic meanings, may provoke 
conflict.  
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Urban competition and growth coalitions 
Since the 1980s, economic development has become a principal preoccupation of 
European cities. Increasingly, economic development is seen as a competitive matter, in 
which cities struggle for advantage in national and international markets. This marks a 
break from the postwar years, in which cities were integrated into national economies, 
planning systems and welfare states, which themselves assumed the obligation to 
maintain some sort of territorial balance. Yet it recalls earlier eras in the early modern 
period or the nineteenth century, when urban leaders had more autonomy and showed a 
certain entrepreneurship and awareness of the need to position themselves strategically 
(Le Gales 2002). It also invites comparison with the United States, where the idea of 
cities competing is a staple of the literature on urban politics (Kantor 1987; Sanders & 
Stone 1987). 
Cities compete for investment, for jobs, for tax base, for visitors, and for state 
subsidies. In a less clearly defined sense, they also compete for visibility and prestige. In 
the United States, where there are fewer restrictions on the part of central (or state) 
government, they spend relatively freely on subsidies, tax breaks, partnerships and other 
special deals for corporations and other investors. European cities, which generally have 
less fiscal autonomy, are deprived of these financial instruments, but at the same time 
more protected from demands for investor subsidies at the taxpayers’ expense (Keating 
1993). However, European economic integration and pressures on national welfare state 
expenditures increase urban competition here as well. This leads urban leaders to follow 
the example of the US and seek other means for stimulating investment and attracting 
mobile capital. 
Yet, it is not by any means clear that they are obliged to do so, or that their efforts 
to attract capital in practice achieves the expected returns.  The economic 
competitiveness paradigm that depicts cities as condemned to compete in a war of ‘all 
against all’ to attract limited investment makes a number of questionable assumptions. 
First, it assumes that cities as local polities are productive units, with an internal logic and 
cohesion, which can then compete against each other (Porter 1990). There is some 
evidence from contemporary literature that local production systems are indeed becoming 
more important and that the economic actors within them may enhance their competitive 
advantage by pooling resources, and co-operating in the production of public goods 
(Storper 1997). It is, however, a large leap from this reasoning to assume that a city, 
which is primarily a political unit, is also a productive unit in competition with others. 
Second, the model assumes that the city has a unitary interest in growth (Peterson, 1981). 
This is a reification, which disguises the fact that the various groups within the city may 
have different interests in distinct growth strategies. Growth policies may not even be 
Pareto optimal in the sense of making some people better off without harming anyone 
else; they tend to come with very definite and identifiable costs. Third, there is an 
assumption that a more entrepreneurial city government can make a difference in 
economic fates (Hubbard and Hall 1998). This is often untestable, since we cannot know 
what would have happened in the absence of growth policies. Yet growth policies have 
the curious advantage that politicians will always gain politically from them, whether 
they work or not. If the city grows and there is a growth policy, the politicians can take 
credit for the growth. If it grows and they do not have a policy, they cannot take credit. If 
there is no growth and they have no policy, they will be blamed for inactivity. If there is 
no growth and they have a policy, they can show that they are addressing a serious 
problem. By making external circumstances such as globalization pressures, urban 
competition, or institutional restraints by state authorities responsible for their failure, 
they can justify their claims for urban autonomy and thus increase their own political 
power base. Therefore we should rather see the theme of urban competition, and the 
associated neo-mercantilist vision of cities vying for limited opportunities, as constructed 
by political and economic elites in order to mobilize support behind particular policy 
stances.  
Economic development policies do not, then, stem from an objective requirement 
imposed by cities’ geo-economic circumstances. They are a political construction, which 
are attractive to politicians in an age of declining class alignments, allowing them to 
predicate a unitary city interest and thus to extend their potential electoral constituency to 
the entire population (Keating 1993). The theme of competition is a highly ideological 
notion, imported from the market and now incorporated by governments into all manner 
of fields, including urban development, the arts, universities and public services. It, too, 
serves to rally political support by postulating a conflict of interest between the unitary 
city, represented by the political elites, and the other, in the form of other cities. The 
American urban politics literature has been very good in deconstructing the role of these 
elites and showing how the city interest has in practice been shaped by their partisan 
interests organized in development coalitions or ‘growth machines’ (Logan and Molotch 
1987; Sanders and Stone 1987).  
Economic development policies have always shown an uneven impact within 
cities. They tend to increase social inequality, as some groups and neighbourhoods do 
well and others suffer. The idea that growth will generate a surplus to be used to 
compensate the losers is only partly sustained, since pro-investor policies need to be 
sustained in order to maintain the growth path. There is also an increase in inequalities 
between cities, as some are better placed to take advantage of global opportunities. This 
in turn sharpens old social and political divisions and produces new ones. The transition 
from manufacturing to service industries, has a differential impact on the fortunes of 
groups by sector, class, gender and location. Urban renewal, which has often 
concentrated on gentrifying city centres and run-down industrial districts by bringing 
back business and the middle classes, may price lower income residents out of their 
neighbourhoods. Conservation policies may increase the wealth of affluent property 
owners. Urban renewal may destroy old communities, with their social and political 
networks. Economic development may have negative environmental consequences. 
Small, local businesses may be upset by the arrival of better-resourced competitors with 
access to outside capital. Investment in economic development may divert expenditure 
away from social or cultural priorities. Not surprisingly, then, development policies, 
originally predicated on a unified city interest and a broad appeal, are often divisive and 
bring into being contestatory social and political movements, with their own competing 
visions of the urban future (Castells 1983); these include Greens and non-governmental 
organizations which become centres for resistance (Bianchini 1993) as well as aggressive 
right-wing populist parties (de Frantz 2003).  
    To overcome these oppositions urban regeneration policies need strong leadership 
with a large degree of autonomy (Judd 2000). This is often a charismatic mayor, but it 
may also be provided by development agencies, run by technical elites or linked to 
sections of the business community.  This, indeed, motivated the establihsment of Urban 
Development Corporations in England and Wales under the last Conservative central 
government as well as the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) by the Scottish Office. 
Alternatively, leadership may be provided by a strongly entrenched local political elite, 
such as a party machine. Machine politics, rooted in patronage and clientelism and the 
distribution of divisible goods, is often seen as inimical to an efficient implementation of 
development politics.  Yet, once committed to the new politics, it may be able to deliver. 
Glasgow in adopting its post-industrial strategy in the 1980s and 1990s owes a lot to the 
dominance of a small policy elite within the Labour group (Keating, 1988). Vienna’s 
Social Democratic party machine, first established in the 1920s, remains strong despite its 
reorientation towards the private sector since the early 1990s, during which it has 
struggled more with its own bureaucracy than with a coherent political opposition. By 
contrast, Berlin’s former CDU party-machine, after managing the first years of transition, 
broke down in 1999 leaving a political vacuum. It is ironic that political machines as 
typical products of the age of the unionized, industrial economy may be the vehicles for 
delivering post-modern and post-industrial urban strategies. 
 
Culture as a Development Tool 
Some European cities have utilized culture, such as museums, galleries, and festivals as a 
development tool. This has certain apparent advantages. Culture can attract visitors, 
especially from more affluent classes, who stay only a short while and make few 
demands on public services. It taps into an expanding sector, linked to the leisure 
economy. Cultural policy can change the image of the city, an important consideration in 
declining industrial cities like Glasgow and Bilbao, so serving as a marketing tool. In a 
crowded international market, it can mark the city as distinct, giving it a brand image. 
This can indirectly promote its economic competitiveness by increasing its position in the 
quality life indexes of international investment rankings. It may also have a psychological 
effect within the city, building self-confidence and civic pride among the population and 
even boosting optimism among investors. This positive image building might even 
distract voters’ attention from more serious social or economic problems in the city. By 
promoting a climate of creativity and individual entrepreneurship, the cultural sector may 
contribute to the development of small and medium enterprise as a locally bound social 
capital. Thus culture-led regeneration offers many attractions for policy-makers 
(Bianchini 1993; Zukin 1995).  
Bilbao, like other old industrial cities, notably Glasgow, has used cultural 
regeneration as part of a broader economic development strategy that aimed to replace 
the city’s devastated industrial base with a booming service sector. As well as its direct 
effects, this is intended to reconstruct the negative image associated with 
deindustrialization by promoting a ‘post-industrial’ image (Gomez 1998). The existence 
of a historic city core and nineteenth century architectural legacy from the years of 
industrial growth is a key asset complementing the symbolic effects of Frank Gehry’s 
Guggenheim museum. Thus tourism can be promoted (Plaza 1999), but the comparative 
experience shows the costs of such image reconstruction (Gomez 1998; Gonzalez and 
Gomez 2001). Glasgow had to sell off its industrial development sites to finance its year 
as European City of Culture. Visitors then tend to be short term, often staying only a day 
and not always spending large amounts of money. Therefore local cultural production 
does not necessarily benefit from such globally oriented image strategies. Also poor cities 
are in a weak position when negotiating with outside investors such as the global 
corporation Guggenheim. So the economic effects from cultural regeneration are often 
reduced to direct consumption effects rather than profiting more productive and 
employment intensive local sectors.  
With regard to the question of the uniqueness of the cultural investment, there is 
probably a first mover advantage, which Glasgow and Bilbao have exploited, in that they 
have occupied their respective niches at an early stage. In Vienna, an old culture city, the 
sudden international fame of the ‘cultural newcomer’ Bilbao spurred a competitive 
response. Tourism managers and politicians felt that Vienna’s historic heritage and high 
culture was not enough to maintain its worldwide reputation. In the emerging cultural 
competition among cities, city marketing started to incorporate associations with 
innovation, creativity, and entrepreneurship to be transmitted only by a new cultural 
flagship, the ‘Museumsquartier’. There the match of existing historic artefacts and 
neighbourhoods with ultra-modernism in art and new design created a locally specific 
blend of tradition and modernity, of stability and dynamism.  Yet compared to media 
coverage of the ‘cultural newcomer’ Bilbao, created almost independently of any existing 
cultural image, Vienna’s leaders considered historic heritage almost as a handicap for its 
marketing strategy (de Frantz 2003). Berlin’s construction of the Potzdamer Platz in the 
early Nineties followed a similar symbolic cultural marketing strategy to symbolize its 
economic rebirth after decades of partition. However, the subsequent financial meltdown 
of Berlin’s municipality showed the political and economic consequences of cultural 
regeneration without a real economic base. Still Berlin, like Vienna, can refer to its 
unquestionably unique historic heritage that makes its cultural profile less dependent 
upon the success of flagship projects and global investors. Although old industrial cities 
like Bilbao can also build on an existing cityscape and cultural legacy derived from their 
pre-industrial past and the era of industrial prosperity, their fame depends more on the 
single flagship.  
     Economic development policy is a potentially contentious and divisive issue, 
although sold as a shared policy that benefits everybody. This is brought into even 
sharper relief in the case of cultural policy, with its multiple meanings and deep 
symbolisms. Cultural artefacts, buildings and performances relate to a past, a present and 
a future that are always contested and invested with new meanings (Tunbridge and 
Ashworth 1996). As Bianchini notes (1993), the political objectives associated with 
culture confront urban decision-makers with a strategic choice, particularly as the 
emerging economic paradigm adds up to and increasingly covers other, pre-existing 
socio-cultural priorities. Around the time of Glasgow’s year as European City of Culture, 
a row broke out over the People’s Palace on Glasgow Green, a site sacred to working 
class and labour traditions. Another conflict arose over plans to redevelop the Green 
itself, given its history as the gathering place of labour and radical movements. Visitors 
entering County Durham in North East England are greeted by a sign welcoming them to 
the Land of the Prince Bishops, this mediaeval reference blotting out the region’s better 
known legacy of coal mining and heavy industry. On the coast is the town of Hartlepool, 
where we will find the Historic Quay, in fact a building completed in the early 1990s 
outside the old docks, and evoking the history of the slave trade among other things. The 
fact that the slave trade was conducted on the west coast, and not from Hartlepool, seems 
beside the point. We can all feel a sense of righteous indignation about an event 
sufficiently remote. Memories of the actual  history of the area as a coal field evoke too 
recent memories of the industrial strife of the 1970s and 1980s and the moral lesson is 
altogether more contested; so this is excised from the history. In the same region, gigantic 
iron sculpture, the Angel of the North, was built in the old shipyards of Hartlepool, 
linking to the past, but has become the focus for all manner of symbolic interpretations, 
from the decline of the sturdy industries of the past, to the suggestion that the wings 
recall a second world war Luftwaffe bomber.  
The manipulation of historic heritage for economic development is a favored 
instrument of tourism marketing, but it can cause a conflict between external 
representation and internal mobilization (Kearns and Philo 1993). Vienna’s population is 
divided between pride and indignation over the way their tourism industry markets the 
city’s heritage to the world. Locals feel alienated by the ‘museumfication’ of their city 
centre that tends to prioritize aesthetic beauty over functionality and tourism over local 
needs. The status of Vienna’s historic center as UNESCO world heritage has raised 
questions about the extent to which monumental protection inhibits present-day 
creativity, indigenous development and real estate investment. Discussions of the historic 
heritage also opened up deeper conflicts over collective memories and national identities 
associated with Austria’s history of two lost world wars and the decline of the Habsburg 
empire (de Frantz 2003). The conflict-loaded meanings associated with urban culture are 
even more apparent in the reconstruction of Berlin’s centre with its multiple memorials of 
German nation-building, idealist humanism, National Socialism, Communism and 
Europe’s Cold War division (de Frantz 2002).  
Regional histories are equally sensitive. Barcelona’s Museum of the Catalan 
People, has an underlying nationalist message, about the progress of Catalonia, its 
oppression under successive regimes and its rebirth after the transition to democracy. 
Edinburgh’s Museum of Scotland is less overtly nationalistic, but there is a similar 
teleology, as the history of ‘Scotland’ is started in the prehistoric era and taken up to 
modernity. Such was the sensitivity of the national issue in the 1990s, however, and the 
reluctance to essentialize modern Scottish culture that the top floor, representing Scotland 
since the 1970s, is a mere lumber room of odd items donated by prominent Scots with no 
discernible message at all.  In the case of Bilbao the new global symbolism of the 
Guggenheim links up with strong nationalist ambitions, as the promotion and protection 
of Basque identity traditionally represented the main concern of regional and local 
cultural policies (Gonzalez 1993).  
    In socially segregated cities, the location of cultural spaces and events is equally 
contentious. Edinburgh’s Festival has regularly been criticized for being largely confined 
to the city centre. Glasgow’s rival Mayfest, launched in the 1980s, was intended as a 
conscious contrast, taking culture to the poorer quarters. The Citizens’ Theatre has 
remained in its Gorbals base, despite plans in the 1980s to move it to a cultural complex 
in the city centre. In Vienna, the location of the new Museums Quarter caused conflict 
between the city government’s desire for a symbolic upgrading of the working class areas 
at the Eastern side of the Danube river and the federal state’s plans for a cultural symbol 
complementing the state institutions and tourism attractions in the center of the capital 
city. In Berlin the construction of the Potzdamer Platz and the plans for the reconstruction 
of the former Castle aimed to overcome the city’s partition through creating a new centre 
as a shared symbol of reunification (de Frantz 2002).  
    There is a recurring battle over the importance of ‘highbrow’ versus ‘lowbrow’ 
culture and whether the distinction itself makes any sense. There is in the Labour 
movement in Scotland, as in other parts of Europe, a strong belief that ‘highbrow’ culture 
is not something exclusively for the middle classes but should be available to all. This 
explains the Labour Party’s traditional opposition to admission charges for museums. The 
issue was particularly controversial when Glasgow’s Burrell collection was opened in the 
1980s in Pollok Park. Although it was promoted as a tourist attraction (and was a key 
event in Glasgow’s transition to a cultural development strategy) the city council insisted 
that entry should be free. Berlin, following the working class state culture imposed upon 
the Eastern part by the past Communist government, has now dedicated its centre to 
relatively broadly accessible high culture consumption. In Vienna, a long tradition of 
Social Democratic cultural education is now being challenged by a conservative federal 
government. But despite the multiple social-political expectations associated with cultural 
policies, the issue is largely discussed among elites, while little addressing the tastes and 
cultural interests of the masses.  
For Bilbao, Gonzalez (1993) identified two competing cultural visions within the 
population. The first, of a ‘European capital’ attracting investment, tourists and business 
visitors to the centralized services of a region and symbolized by a large cultural district 
was realized through the Guggenheim complex. The second is based on indigenous 
strengths meeting the needs of local residents, including deprived areas, through the 
decentralization of services and small, manageable and well distributed cultural facilities. 
This would link up economic objectives with pre-existing cultural policies associated 
with Basque identity politics and local working class culture. In the absence of better 
economic alternatives, Bilbao’s politicians chose the global development version, which 
no doubt offers economic advantages at least for some parts of the urban population.  Yet 
urban leaders attempting to impose a cultural consensus upon the plural meanings of their 
city often lose control of the resulting symbolic conflicts. Instead of promoting a unitary 
image of the city externally and internally, cultural regeneration strategies can have the 
opposite effect. In particular where the image of social harmony and economic success 
differs greatly from the economic reality, it is difficult to turn cultural investments into 
economic profit. 
 
Conclusion: 
Following the growth paradigm, urban politicians increasingly adopt public-private 
partnerships and growth strategies. They thus hope to increase the financial resources 
available for urban development, reduce dependence on state government and 
bureaucracy, and promote private entrepreneurship. The result is smaller, more 
autonomous, flexible, and informal forms of urban ‘governance’ but the potential for 
citizen participation, civic engagement, and the political responsiveness associated with 
local democracy remains limited. The competitive imperative, rather, enhances the role of 
local leadership and raises questions of political accountability and equality of 
representation. It also brings out new social and economic conflicts. 
Cultural regeneration is an even more problematic strategy due to the multiple and 
contested meanings associated with urban symbols. Cultural flagships cannot represent a 
prototype to be duplicated successfully in different locations and contexts. Dependent on 
the opportunities given for political participation and cultural self-expression, culture can 
serve both as a powerful catalyst for economic regeneration and as a source of political 
controversy over the future of the city. It might also serve to smother conflicts with a 
superficial pro-growth consensus while serving the interest of a small elite. While it is 
difficult to measure the economic returns from the symbolic effects of cultural strategies, 
in Bilbao the construction of the Guggenheim museum has definitely changed the city’s 
image. By turning the city’s regeneration efforts into a global spectacle, it created a 
cultural model for other cities’ development plans. Moreover, the drastic contrasts 
between the Guggenheim’s global culture and the city’s deindustrialized context initiated 
discourse at the global as well as at the local level about the role of politics in the 
relationship of economy and culture. 
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